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## METAPHYSICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CAUSATION: POWERS OR LAWS OF NATURE?\*

Abstract: In this article, I discuss Richard Swinburne's case for the conception of substance causation, identified with the substances-powers-liabilities (SPL) account of causation, versus the conception of event causation, identified with alternative accounts. I specify the place of Swinburne's argument in the debates about agent causation, and uncover reasons to be sceptical about the claims that substance causation is a genuine alternative to event causation, and that it helps to comprehend the specifics of the causation involved in free agency. I also advance considerations in favour of the relations-between-universals (RBU) account of causation that can make it preferable to the SPL account.

**Keywords:** event causation, agent causation, substance, disposition, power, law of nature

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